Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Salut Underground Nuclear Test in U20ak, Nevada National Security Site, and the Impact of Stability of the Ground Surface

At the request of Jerry Sweeney, the LLNL Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Salut underground nuclear test in U20ak to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Review of the Salut site is complicated because the test experienced a subsurface, rather than surface, collapse. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Salut detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeologogy due to the nuclear detonation. Sweeney's proposal requires physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site), and focuses on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow, and deep geophysical surveys

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation at the Norbo Underground Nuclear Test in U8c, Nevada Nuclear Security Site, and the Impact on Stability of the Ground Surface

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Containment Program performed a review of nuclear test-related data for the Norbo underground nuclear test in U8c to assist in evaluating this legacy site as a test bed for application technologies for use in On-Site Inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This request is similar to one made for the Salut site in U8c (Pawloski, 2012b). Review of the Norbo site is complicated because the test first exhibited subsurface collapse, which was not unusual, but it then collapsed to the surface over one year later, which was unusual. Of particular interest is the stability of the ground surface above the Norbo detonation point. Proposed methods for on-site verification include radiological signatures, artifacts from nuclear testing activities, and imaging to identify alteration to the subsurface hydrogeology due to the nuclear detonation. Aviva Sussman from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has also proposed work at this site. Both proposals require physical access at or near the ground surface of specific underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and focus on possible activities such as visual observation, multispectral measurements, and shallow and deep geophysical surveys

Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation for Selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Underground Nuclear Tests - 2011, Part 2

This report evaluates collapse evolution for selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) underground nuclear tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly called the Nevada Test Site). The work is being done to support several different programs that desire access to the ground surface above expended underground nuclear tests. The programs include: the Borehole Management Program, the Environmental Restoration Program, and the National Center for Nuclear Security Gas-Migration Experiment. Safety decisions must be made before a crater area, or potential crater area, can be reentered for any work. Evaluation of cavity collapse and crater formation is input into the safety decisions. Subject matter experts from the LLNL Containment Program who participated in weapons testing activities perform these evaluations. Information used included drilling and hole construction, emplacement and stemming, timing and sequence of the selected test and nearby tests, geology, yield, depth of burial, collapse times, surface crater sizes, cavity and crater volume estimations, ground motion, and radiological release information. Both classified and unclassified data were reviewed. The evaluations do not include the effects of erosion that may modify the collapse craters over time. They also do not address possible radiation dangers that may be present. Various amounts of information are available for these tests, depending on their age and other associated activities. Lack of data can hamper evaluations and introduce uncertainty. We make no attempt to quantify this uncertainty. Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation for Selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Underground Nuclear Tests - 2011 was published on March 2, 2011. This report, considered Part 2 of work undertaken in calendar year 2011, compiles evaluations requested after the March report. The following unclassified summary statements describe collapse evolution and crater stability in response to a recent request to review 6 LLNL test locations in Yucca Flat, Rainier Mesa, and Pahute Mesa. They include: Baneberry in U8d; Clearwater in U12q; Wineskin in U12r, Buteo in U20a and Duryea in nearby U20a1; and Barnwell in U20az

Realistic Covariance Generation for the GPM Spacecraft

A covariance realism process for NASA's Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) spacecraft is detailed. The GPM spacecraft is in a low earth orbit, and performs collision avoidance maneuvers few times a year. Currently GPM is below the International Space Station (ISS). So, in addition to cataloged debris objects, GPM must contend with smallsat/cubesat objects that are deployed from the ISS. Both operational scenarios require complete knowledge of the expected GPM prediction errors as a function of time. In this study, we present a method for generating realistic predicted covariance that uses linear propagation of the covariance with the addition of process noise. Further analyses are presented for the process noise ''tuning'' that generates an inflation factor based on the observed error statistics of the predictive satellite trajectories when compared to the definitive ones. Different tuning strategies are considered and compared via a Goodness-of-Fit testing for the Gaussian properties of the scaled covariance. SpaceNav's realistic covariance generation approach takes into account the contribution of predicted maneuver errors in the increased propagation uncertainty. Corresponding maneuver uncertainty is injected into the state uncertainty, and is used within the collision avoidance process to determine the collision risk for close approach events that follow a maneuver. This is a critical step in the maneuver planning process that provides the satellite operator with an accurate quantification of the collision probability for planned maneuvers. Using this information, an informed decision can be made to proceed with a maneuver if the collision risk is acceptable. This approach is validated by Monte-Carlo simulations and results are presented

The Underground Test Area Project of the Nevada Test Site: Building Confidence in Groundwater Flow and Transport Models at Pahute Mesa Through Focused Characterization Studies

Pahute Mesa at the Nevada Test Site contains about 8.0E+07 curies of radioactivity caused by underground nuclear testing. The Underground Test Area Subproject has entered Phase II of data acquisition, analysis, and modeling to determine the risk to receptors from radioactivity in the groundwater, establish a groundwater monitoring network, and provide regulatory closure. Evaluation of radionuclide contamination at Pahute Mesa is particularly difficult due to the complex stratigraphy and structure caused by multiple calderas in the Southwestern Nevada Volcanic Field and overprinting of Basin and Range faulting. Included in overall Phase II goals is the need to reduce the uncertainty and improve confidence in modeling results. New characterization efforts are underway, and results from the first year of a three-year well drilling plan are presented

Lessons from a Minimal Genome: What Are the Essential Organizing Principles of a Cell Built from Scratch?

One of the primary challenges facing synthetic biology is reconstituting a living system from its component parts. A particularly difficult landmark is reconstituting a self‐organizing system that can undergo autonomous chromosome compaction, segregation, and cell division. Here, we discuss how the syn3.0 minimal genome can inform us of the core self‐organizing principles of a living cell and how these self‐organizing processes can be built from the bottom up. The review underscores the importance of fundamental biology in rebuilding life from its molecular constituents.A primary challenge in synthetic biology is reconstituting self‐organizing systems that can undergo autonomous chromosome compaction, segregation, and cell division. Here, we discuss how the syn3.0 minimal genome sheds light on the core self‐organizing principles of living cells and how these self‐organizing processes can be built from the bottom up.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/152011/1/cbic201900249.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/152011/2/cbic201900249_am.pd

Turning Points in Containment of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Underground Nuclear Tests

Sometime in 1987 Billy Hudson, a long-time LLNL Containment Scientist and the Task Leader for Containment Diagnostics, put together a presentation entitled ''Turning Points in Containment''. This presentation identifies challenges, lessons learned, and changes made in containment practice over a 20-year period, from 1967-1987. Besides providing a significant historical summary, the presentation is valuable as we maintain a position of readiness 14 years after the last underground nuclear detonation. It is particularly valuable to personnel who are new to the program and have no first-hand experience in implementing underground nuclear test containment for actual tests. We now view this material as a unique containment summary with timeless importance. We envision this report to be particularly useful to new Containment Program members and anyone interested in the history of underground nuclear test containment practices. We believe that the Barnwell test, detonated in 1989, would have been added to this summary if Billy Hudson had the opportunity to update the presentation. We have chosen to add a few slides to the end of the original presentation to describe the issues and lessons learned from Barnwell